Epistemic Non-Factualism and Methodology by Clarke-Doane, Justin
Justin Clarke-Doane 
Columbia University 
 
[This is a penultimate draft of a paper that is forthcoming in ​Higher Order Evidence and Moral 
Epistemology​ edited by Michael Klenk.] 
 
Epistemic Non-Factualism and Methodology  1
I discuss methodology in epistemology.  I argue that settling the facts, even the epistemic facts, 
fails to settle the questions of intellectual policy at the center of our epistemic lives.  An upshot is 
that the standard methodology of analyzing concepts like knowledge, justification, rationality, 
and so on is misconceived.  More generally, any epistemic method that seeks to issue in 
intellectual policy by settling the facts, whether by way of abductive theorizing or empirical 
investigation, ​no matter how reliable​, is inapt.  The argument is a radicalization of Moore’s Open 
Question Argument.  I conclude by considering the ramifications of this conclusion for the 
debate surrounding “Modal Security”, a proposed necessary condition on undermining defeat. 
 
The Prospect of Pluralism 
In his [2005], Alston argues that certain debates in epistemology might be merely verbal.  One 
party may be using the target word in one way, while the other is using it in another.  If Alston is 
right, then paradigmatic debates in epistemology would be like a “debate” between moving 
observers over the simultaneity of two events.  There would be a plurality of properties in the 
1 ​Thanks to J. Adam Carter Michael Klenk, ​Christos Kyriacou, ​Chris Scambler, and Justin Vlasits for helpful 
comments. 
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neighborhood, giving intuitively opposite verdicts on the question of whether X’s belief that P 
counts as knowledge, or is justified, or is supported by some evidence, and each party may be 
right of one of them.  (“Intuitively” because the rival properties would strictly give verdicts on 
different questions -- questions of knowledge​1​ and knowledge​2,​ say -- as with simultaneity.) 
 
What would become of epistemological debates if Alston were right?  It might be thought that 
they would go away, just like debates about simultaneity.  We have given up the question of 
what is simultaneous with what in favor of the question of what is simultaneous with what 
relative to R, for variable reference frame, R.  We would likewise give up the question of 
whether X’s belief counts as knowledge, or is justified, or is supported by some evidence.  There 
would be different properties in the neighborhood, and all sides could agree that X’s belief 
exemplified one but not another.   There would be no question left to ponder. 
 
However, there is an essential difference between the cases.  Epistemology is normative, while 
physics is not.  Whatever that means exactly, it at least​ it means that the truths it discovers about 
knowledge, justification, evidence, and on typically issue in ​policy​.  They issue in what to do, 
believe, infer, and so forth.  It would be bewildering if an epistemologist were to say: “the 
evidential support relation is, R, but do not worry about having beliefs that bear R to the 
evidence” (much as it would be if an ethicist were to say: “goodness is property G, but do not 
worry about seeking things that are G”).  It would just invite the question: “why care about 
evidential support?”  There are myriad properties that epistemologists could investigate.  What 
makes knowledge, justification, and so on important is their connection to intellectual policy. 
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 This means that pluralism in epistemology would be a problem in a way that pluralism is not in 
the case of simultaneity.  There would be a residue of policy questions which would be left 
unresolved by the epistemic facts.  There would be justification​1​, knowledge​1​, and evidential 
support​1​, as well as justification​2​, knowledge​2​, and evidential support​2​.  Learning that, e.g., our 
belief that P is supported​1​ by the evidence, but not supported​2​ would leave the policy question 
unanswered: ​whether to​ ​believe P​.  And while it might be thought that this question would just 
be resolved by a higher-order fact about which properties we epistemically ​ought ​to consult, that 
assumes that Alston’s worries do not arise for terms like “epistemically ought” themselves.  If 
they did, then while we epistemically ought​1​ consult properties P​1​, P​2​,... we epistemically ought​2 
consult properties Q​1​, Q​2​,....  Our original question would merely get transposed.  The policy 
question would now be whether to do what we epistemically ought​1​ or ought​2​ to do.  
 
Illusive Questions 
I have been writing as if epistemological facts would fail to settle policy questions only if Alston 
were right about natural language semantics.  There is no problem so long as he is wrong, and we 
all happen to use “knowledge”, “justification”, and so on in the same way.  But, actually, a 
problem like the above arises in any case.  Let us grant that epistemic terms are systematically 
univocal.  We can always ​stipulatively introduce​ epistemic-like terms which diverge in extension 
(Eklund [2017]).  And now the ​policy ​question simply rearises: whether to consult these new 
properties or the old ones when regulating our beliefs, inferences, and practices generally.  
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Could this question be settled by the epistemic facts?  It could not, on pain of triviality.  If the 
epistemic facts are good for anything, then they are self-sanctioning in the sense that we 
epistemically ought to use epistemic ought.  But this banality does not help us.  We epistemically 
ought to use epistemic ought.  We also epistemically* ought to use epistemic* ought, for various 
alternative epistemic-like properties (or operators), epistemic ought*.   Whenever ought-like 2
concepts diverge in extension, they issue in conflicting policy.  We are left with the question of 
which to follow.  On pain of triviality, this cannot turn on the question of which we ought to 
follow 
  
This argument suggests that epistemic facts, even if there are any, and even if they are the 
(determinate) subject of epistemic debates, fail to settle questions at the center of our epistemic 
lives.  The argument is actually an example of a more general one.  In his [1903, Section 13] 
Moore noted that an agent may believe that A is F, for any ​descriptive ​property, F, while failing 
to judge that A is morally good.   For instance, if A is prioritizing one’s offspring, then she may 3
believe that this is natural, or that it is what we would desire to desire, or that it would maximize 
a certain psychological state, while failing to judge that doing this is morally good.  However, 
there is a sense in which Moore’s point can be generalized even to evaluative properties, like 
goodness, themselves (Clarke-Doane [2015], [Forthcoming]).  An agent may believe that A is F, 
for any property whatever, while failing to “endorse” A in the sense that is characteristic of 
practical deliberation.  This is because she may always wonder whether to do what is F, rather 
than F*, for some alternative F-like property, F*.   As Blackburn puts it, “[e]​ven if [a moral] 4
2 I borrow the star notation from Eklund [2017]. 
3 See Greco [2015] for an epistemic analog of Moore’s argument. 
4 And not just in the sense that we all threaten to be weak in will.  
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belief were settled, there would still be issues of what importance to give it, what to do, and all 
the rest….For any fact, there is a question of what to do about it [1998, 70].”  Settling the facts, 
even the evaluative facts​, fails to settle the policy questions at the center of our evaluative lives. 
 
It might be objected that this “New Open Question Argument” merely shows that we have failed 
to identify the facts that settle policy questions.  Perhaps, for instance, it is facts about which 
epistemic-like properties we ought to consult in some ​non-epistemic​ sense of “ought”, whether 
moral, prudential, or all-things-considered (Das [Forthcoming]).  Many epistemologists would 
hold that epistemic norms are not ​overriding​.  Sometimes we ought to do what we epistemically 
ought not.  If a gun is put to my head with the credible threat that my friend will be killed unless 
I believe that the number of stars is even, then I ought to believe, though I epistemically ought 
not.  But if the argument works, then it works for ​any evaluative terms​ -- whether moral, 
prudential, epistemic, or all-things-considered.  Even if we all-things-considered ought to consult 
epistemic properties, we all-things-considered ought* not.  And the ​policy ​question just re-arises 
whether to do what we all-things-considered ought, or all-things-considered ought*, to do.  
 
Nor could the remaining question be one of speculative metaphysics.  We know from Goodman 
[1983] that having true beliefs about a subject is one thing, and “getting it right” is another. 
Getting it right at least arguably requires having true beliefs that ascribe natural kinds.  So, one 
might be tempted to suggest that the question of which epistemic-like properties to consult turns 
on the metaphysical question of which epistemic-like properties are natural kinds.   But either the 5
5 ​Perhaps this is what Werner means in speaking of “concepts [that] adequately characterize the robustly normative 
properties [Werner 2017, 9]”, or what McPherson means by “authoritatively normative” [Forthcoming b]. 
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question of which epistemic-like properties are natural kinds is itself evaluative or not.  If not, 
then Moore’s Open Question Argument applies.  Learning that epistemic ought is a natural kind 
would be like learning that it is heavy.  It would be neither here nor there from the standpoint of 
policy.  But if the question of which epistemic-like properties are natural kinds ​is ​evaluative, 
then the argument can just be re-run ​vis a vis​ natural kind-hood.  Even if epistemic ought is a 
natural kind, it is not a natural* kind, for some naturalness-like concept, natural*, and now the 
question is whether to theorize in terms of natural or natural* kinds (Dasgupta [2017]).  
 
Maybe policy questions turn on an ​ineffable ​question of fact (Eklund [2017])?  It does not seem 
so.  There are two ways in which the target propositions -- call them “policy propositions” -- 
could be ineffable.  First, they could be structurally ineffable in the sense of Hofweber [2017]. 
Their ineffability could be due to their failure to share anything like sentential structure.  But, if 
this were so, then it would be impossible to explain the connection between our linguistic 
behavior with epistemic sentences and the policy propositions we ponder.  If you utter S and I 
reply ~S, where S is an epistemic sentence, then we should at least be able to conclude that the 
policy propositions that we believe are inconsistent (even if they are not expressed by the 
sentences, S, and ~S).  But if those propositions are structurally ineffable, then we do not even 
know whether “consistency” ​makes sense ​as applied to them -- since we do not know whether 
there is any operation on them corresponding to sentential negation.  So, it is more promising to 
suggest that policy propositions are ineffable because, while they share sentential structure, 
policy ​properties ​are ineffable.  If this is why policy propositions are ineffable, however, then we 
can simply reformulate the problem that policy propositions were supposed to solve.  If there are 
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a plurality of epistemic-like facts, then there are a plurality of policy-like facts as well.  (Whether 
those facts are effable is neither here nor there.)  And the question remains which to consult.  6
 
Non-Factualism and Methodology 
So, the policy questions at the center of our evaluative lives are not settled by the facts -- whether 
evaluative or not.  Since the only way this could be is if those questions are not themselves 
questions of fact, it follows that the policy questions at the center of our evaluative lives are not 
questions of fact.  They are the questions of “​what importance to give [the facts], what to do, and 
all the rest”​ which remain ​after ​the facts are settled.  In particular, even if there are epistemic 
facts, and even if they are the subject of typical epistemological debate, a central goal of any 
normative discipline like epistemology must be to issue in policy.  And not even epistemic facts 
can do that -- for much the reason that they could not if Alston were right about semantics. 
 
This conclusion, if correct, has significant ramifications for epistemic methodology.  Consider 
what is perhaps the standard methodology in epistemology, conceptual analysis.  We consider 
cases, and ask what we would “say”.  Paradigms include Gettier [1966]’s “counterexamples” to 
the justified-true-belief analysis of knowledge, Goldman [1976]’s fake barn case, and Bonjour 
[1980]’s clairvoyant Norman.  There is considerable debate about whether conceptual analysis is 
a reliable means by which to determine the facts about knowledge, justification, and so on.  But, 
for our purposes, we can assume that the methodology is infallible.  What is important is that this 
6 Nor could the further fact be a mind-dependent question one ​a la ​Street [2006, Sec. 7] or Korsgaard [1996].  Again, 
if this “New Open Question Argument” works, it works equally to show that the evaluative facts ​constructivistically 
construed​ fail to settle policy questions.  For instance, just as we can wonder whether to do what we ought​1​ as 
opposed to ought​2 ​to do, realistically construed, we can wonder whether to be an agent or a shmagent (Enoch 
[2006]). 
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is not enough to show that results arrived at by way of conceptual analysis settle intellectual 
policy.  For that assumes that we ought to ​defer to the concepts that we happen to have inherited​.
  Even if we could accumulate “epistemic theorems” as robust as Euclid’s, maybe our epistemic 7
concepts are corrupt, or merely sub-maximal.  In that case, we could agree with Gettier, 
Goldman, Bonjour, and so on completely about the epistemic facts while disagreeing with them 
in the way that matters.  We could advocate consulting epistemic*, rather than epistemic, facts. 
 
Let us consider a contemporary example.  “Modal Security” is a currently discussed proposed 
necessary condition on undermining defeat (Clarke-Doane [2015], [Forthcoming, Chapter 4]). 
At first approximation, it says that if evidence undermines (rather than rebuts) our belief, then it 
gives us reason to doubt the belief’s modal security.  The intuition is that if evidence neither tells 
directly against P (as it would if it were rebutting), nor against the security of our belief as to 
whether P, then it makes no sense to give it up.  More carefully, the principle reads as follows. 
 
Modal Security​: If evidence, E, ​undermines​ our belief that P, then E gives us direct 
reason to doubt that our belief is sensitive or safe ​or​ E undermines the belief that <the 
belief that P is safe and sensitive> (Baras and Clarke-Doane [Forthcoming]). 
 
Sensitivity and safety are defined as follows. 
 
7 See Stich [1990] for a worry in the same spirit as this one. 
8 
Sensitivity​: Our belief that P is sensitive just in case had it been that ¬P, we would not 
still have believed that P (had we used the method that we actually used to determine 
whether P). 
 
Safety​: Our belief that P is safe just in case we could not have easily had a false belief as 
to whether or not Q, where Q is any proposition similar enough to P (using the method 
that we actually used to determine whether or not P). 
 
The primary interest of Modal Security is its bearing on epistemological arguments against 
realism.  The two most prominent examples are Genealogical Debunking Arguments against 
moral realism, and the Benacerraf-Field Challenge against mathematical realism.  If Modal 
Security is true, then all such arguments would seem to fail (Clarke-Doane [Forthcoming, 
Chapter 4]).  Consequently, there has been considerable interest in whether it is true. 
 
For our purposes, it does not matter whether Modal Security is true, however.  What matters is 
the relevance of arguments for and against it to question of intellectual policy.  The most 
prominent argument against it is that knowledge that P requires a “connection”, whether causal 
or not, between our belief that P and the fact that P (Faraci [2019], Locke and Korman 
[Forthcoming]).  It does not suffice that our belief that P is safe and sensitive.  If knowledge is 
the norm of belief, and evidence that our belief that P fails to satisfy that norm undermines 
whatever justification the belief enjoyed, then evidence that there is no connection between our 
belief that P and the fact that P undermines that belief -- even if it fails to tell against our belief’s 
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safety or sensitivity.  Since Modal Security says that it does not, Modal Security is false if this 
argument is sound.  8
 
Let us suppose that knowledge that P does require a connection between our belief that P and the 
fact that P; that knowledge is the norm of belief; that evidence that a belief falls short of that 
norm undermines it; and, hence, that Modal Security is false.  Shall we adopt the policy of giving 
up (defeasibly) justified beliefs in light of evidence that neither tells directly against their 
contents nor against the security of their truth ​on this basis alone​?  Surely not.  The argument 
above just tells us what is “packed into” the concepts we happen to have inherited -- or, 
semantically descending, the conditions under which the corresponding properties are 
instantiated.  This does nothing evidently to tell us how to regulate our beliefs (even if it does 
settle the question of how we​ epistemically ought ​to regulate them).  Indeed, if our goal is 
anything like having true beliefs, then giving up a (defeasibly) justified belief on the ground that 
it lacks a “connection” to the truth would seem to be like giving it up because it is not polite. 
The truth-seekers among us would seem better served by opting out of such epistemic etiquette.  
 
My point is not to advocate the policy of abiding by Modal Security.  It is that its truth ​per se​ is 
of doubtful relevance to the policy question.  An advocate of Modal Security who is convinced 
that knowledge requires a connection between our belief and the truth will just advocate aspiring 
to knowledge* instead -- where knowledge* is like knowledge, but does not require a connection 
between our belief and the truth.  She is like one who advocates not retributing against the 
8 See Bergmann [1997] for other reasons one might think that Modal Security is false. 
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responsible.  If deserving retribution is “packed into” the concept of responsibility, then such a 
person will just advocate holding people responsible* instead -- where responsibility* is like 
responsibility, except that one can be responsible* without deserving (or deserving*) retribution. 
Settling the epistemic, and generally evaluative, facts fails to settle the policy questions at issue.  
 
Of course, the methodology of conceptual analysis has been widely criticized for reasons that are 
independent of the present discussion.   But it should be clear that the problem above is not 
peculiar to it.  It arises equally for ​any method that seeks to decide on epistemic policy by 
determining the epistemic facts​.  This includes the abductive methodology of Williamson [2007], 
and the naturalistic methodology of Quine [1969], no less than the method of conceptual 
analysis.  The policy questions at stake in epistemology, as in other evaluative domains, are not 
questions of what we ​ought ​to do or believe.  They are questions of what ​to ​do or believe.  And 
these questions remain open even when the facts, ​including the evaluative ones​, are closed. 
 
Conclusion 
I have argued that knowledge of the epistemic facts fails to settle the policy questions at the 
center of our epistemic lives.  This means that the standard method of analyzing concepts like 
knowledge, justification, and so on is misconceived.  But it means something stronger.  It means 
that ​settling the facts, whether by conceptual analysis or in any other way, is an inappropriate 
method by which to arrive at intellectual policy​.  For example, if “​the implication relation 
[classically] defined agrees with the pre-theoretic notion of implication between statements 
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[Zach Forthcoming, 1]”, then the policy question just gets transposed.  The question is now 
whether to use our pre-theoretic notion or another.  ​This argument is a radicalization of Moore’s.  
 
Note that I have not argued that “anything goes”.  That would only follow if policy questions 
failed to be settled at all if they failed to be settled by the facts.  But, as non-cognitivists have 
long argued, this does not follow.  Policy questions -- whether moral, epistemic, or prudential -- 
are settled by practical reasoning.  The point is that such reasoning is not reducible to reasoning 
about the facts.  Policy questions are impervious to how plentiful the facts turn out to be. 
 
Bibliography 
Alston, William. [2005] ​Beyond "Justification": Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation​. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
Baras, Dan and Justin Clarke-Doane. [Forthcoming] “Modal Security”. ​Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research. 
Bergmann, Michael. [1997] “Internalism, Externalism, and Epistemic Defeat.” PhD Dissertation: 
University of Notre Dame. 
BonJour, L. 1980. “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge,” ​Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy​ 5, 53-73. 
Blackburn, Simon. ​[1998] ​Ruling Passions​. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Clarke-Doane, Justin. [2015] ​"Objectivity in Ethics and Mathematics," Ben Colburn (ed.), 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, The Virtual Issue, No. 3 (Methods in Ethics)​.  Available 
online at: <​http://www.aristoteliansociety.org.uk/pdf/2015_virtual_issue.pdf​> 
12 
-----. [Forthcoming] ​Morality and Mathematics. ​Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Das, Ramon. [Forthcoming] “Moral Pluralism and Companions in Guilt.” in Cowie, Christopher 
and Richard Rowland (eds.), ​Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics. ​Routledge. 
Dasgupta, Shamik. [2017] “Normative Non-Naturalism and the Problem of Authority.” 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. ​Vol. 3. 297-319. 
Eklund, Matti. [2017] ​Choosing Normative Concepts. ​Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Moore, G.E. [1903] ​Principia Ethica. ​Available online at: 
<​http://fair-use.org/g-e-moore/principia-ethica​> 
Enoch, David. [2006] “Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come from What Is 
Constitutive of Action.” ​Philosophical Review​. Vol. 115. 169-198. 
Faraci, David. [2019] “Groundwork for an Explanationist Account of Epistemic Coincidence.” 
Philosophers’ Imprint. ​Vol. 19.  Available online at: 
<​https://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/phimp/3521354.0019.004/1​> 
Gettier, Edmund. [1966] “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” ​Analysis​. Vol. 23. 121-123. 
Goldman, Alvin. [1976] “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.” ​The Journal of 
Philosophy​. Vol. 73. 771–791.  
Goodman, Nelson. [1983] ​Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (4th Edition). ​Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Greco, Daniel. [2015] “Epistemological Open Questions.” ​Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 
Vol. 93. 509--522.  
13 
Hofweber, Thomas. [2017] “Are There Ineffable Aspects of Reality?” in Bennett, Karen, and 
Dean Zimmerman (eds.), ​Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Vol. 2. ​Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 155-206. 
Korsgaard, Christine. [1996]  T​he Sources of Normativity. ​New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Locke, Dustin and Dan Korman. [Forthcoming] “Against Minimalist Responses to Moral 
Debunking Arguments.” ​Oxford Studies in Metaethics. 
McPherson, Tristram. [Forthcoming] “Authoritatively Normative Concepts.” Shafer-Landau 
(ed.), ​Oxford Studies in Metaethics.  ​Available online at: 
<​https://philpapers.org/archive/MCPANC.pdf​> 
Quine, W.V.O. [1969] “Epistemology Naturalized.” in ​Ontological Relativity and Other Essays​. 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
Stich, Stephen. [1990] ​The Fragmentation of Reason ​Cambridge, MA: MIT. 
Street, Sharon. [2006] “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.” ​Philosophical 
Studies. ​Vol. 127. 109-166. 
Werner, Preston. [2018] “Why Conceptual Competence Won’t Help the Non-Naturalist 
Epistemologist.” ​Canadian Journal of Philosophy. ​Vol. 48. 616-637. 
Zach, Richard. [Forthcoming] “Rumfitt on Truth-Grounds, Negation, and Vagueness.” 
Philosophical Studies. ​Available online at: <https://philarchive.org/archive/ZACROT-3> 
 
 
 
14 
